Each entry has five parts:
COVERAGE-0.1-VS-2.0.md maps each 0.1 capability to its 2.0 replacement.
"name" and the backend runs
the second. General-purpose parsers accept duplicates by default and bring version conflicts
into host JVMs.engine.json.Json, JsonLimits, JsonPointer.JsonTest, McpServerHandlerTest.transportLevelRejections (a duplicate method returns -32700).CallerIdentity carried the caller’s outbound Authorization header, and a
passthrough resolver existed. That is the confused-deputy pattern the MCP security best practices
forbid.CallerIdentity has actor, effective subject, groups, issuer, auth method and actor
chain, and nothing secret. A static-credential source sends the gateway’s service credential. An
own-host source with credentials.type: token-exchange sends the verified inbound JWT only to the
configured token endpoint, which returns a backend-audience token; the inbound token is never sent to
the protected backend.engine.model.CallerIdentity, spi.SubjectToken, spi.CredentialProvider,
config.credentials.StaticCredentialProvider, TokenExchangeCredentials.GatewayHostTest.jwtAuthenticatedValidateApprovePromoteOverHttp (a static-credential
backend sees auth=null, not the JWT), TokenExchangeCredentialsTest, and the Keycloak 26.8.0 run.BACKEND_ERROR. There is no fallback.GovernanceEngine.govern.GovernanceEngineTest.deniedCallNeverResolvesCredentialsOrReachesBackend, ...auditFailureDeniesBeforeExecution.allowedGroups, writeGroups and destructiveGroups. tools/list
applies the same filter.GovernanceEngine.exposure, GovernedTool.allowedGroups.GovernanceEngineTest.unknownToolIsNotExposedAndWriteToolsAreHiddenFromReadOnlyCallers,
McpServerHandlerTest.discoverAndListArePrivateCacheableAndFilteredPerCaller, Knox cold install K2.type, properties, required, additionalProperties, enum,
const, string lengths, numeric bounds and array items. pattern is intentionally not evaluated
(upstream regex in the gateway is a ReDoS risk). Local $refs (#, #/$defs/..., #/definitions/...)
are resolved and enforced, cycles included; a $ref to anything else is never fetched and the call is
denied. Composition keywords (anyOf, oneOf, allOf) are not evaluated.engine.control.SchemaValidator.ControlsTest.schemaSubsetValidation, SchemaRefTest, GovernanceEngineTest.schemaViolationsAreInvalidInput, ExampleConfigsTest.flink / spark.Scope.resourceOf used the first top-level argument, and a missing value became
approval scope *..., wildcard or control-character value is SCOPE_DENIED.engine.catalog.ResourceRule.GovernanceEngineTest.missingResourceIsDeniedNeverWidenedToWildcard, ExampleConfigsTest.spark (path traversal).scopes: list which groups may touch which resource globs. When configured, every
resource of a call must be covered.engine.control.ScopeRule.ExampleConfigsTest.iceberg (analyst to the finance namespace is denied), RealIcebergRestCatalogTest.true. Nothing
is cached. An exception denies.engine.control.RulePolicy, config.policy.OpaPolicy.OpaPolicyTest, GovernanceEngineTest.denyRuleOverridesAllowRule, ExampleConfigsTest.iceberg / kafka.BoundedHttp). Plugin sources that
speak their own protocol report their configured endpoints (ToolSource.configuredEndpoints): the
Kafka Admin source reports each bootstrap server as tcp://host:port and the Spark Connect source
its server. Those hosts join the allow list like an HTTP baseUrl, and every call checks them and
every DNS answer for them before the client is used.engine.control.EgressGuard, ValueWalker, ToolSource.configuredEndpoints.ControlsTest.wildcardHostDoesNotAllowPrivateAnswersAndEveryAnswerIsChecked,
...operatorCidrCanAllowAPrivateBackendExplicitly,
GovernanceEngineTest.nestedUrlArgumentToPrivateAddressIsDenied, ExampleConfigsTest.flink
(cloud-metadata URL), ExistingMcpServerProxyTest.oversizedDownstreamResponseIsBoundedAndRedirectsAreNotFollowed,
KafkaAdminEgressTest (a broker name resolving outside allowCidrs is EGRESS_DENIED before the
Admin client is used), ExampleConfigsTest.kafkaConnectAndAdminClient (a real broker reached through the check).tryConsume over-incremented on refusal.StateStore. The counter that refuses a call
is not charged. Counters checked earlier in the same call (per caller before per tool before
budget) stay charged, because the limit is attempt-based. There is no response cache, so nothing
bypasses the budget.engine.control.RateLimiter, StateStore.tryAcquire.ControlsTest.rateWindowDoesNotOverIncrementOnRefusal, GovernanceEngineTest.rateLimitRefusalDoesNotConsumeCapacity.engine.control.CircuitBreakers.GovernanceEngineTest.breakerOpensAfterConsecutiveFailuresAndHalfOpensWithOneProbe.engine.control.InjectionScreen.GovernanceEngineTest.nestedAndObfuscatedInjectionIsDenied, ...poisonedDescriptionIsQuarantinedAtLoad.tools/call would leave the larger surface ungoverned, because resources, prompts and
completion are how data and instructions actually reach the model’s context.GovernanceHook runs for all four operations (TOOL_CALL, RESOURCE_READ,
PROMPT_GET, COMPLETION). before may deny; afterTool and afterContent may rewrite or
withhold. Hooks run in configured order at step 8, after every built-in check and before approval,
so denial order and audit output stay deterministic. Deny codes are restricted to the registry.
Content hooks run before redaction, the size bound and the content screen, so whatever a hook adds
is still guarded on the way out.engine.spi.GovernanceHook (with HookDenied for an explained withholding),
engine.control.HookRunner shared by the tool and content chains, config.spi.GovernanceHookFactory.HooksTest, ContentHooksTest, GovernanceEngineTest.hooksRunInOrderAndFailClosed.tools/list, resources/list, prompts/list) do not run hooks. They are
filtered by exposure and patterns, redacted and screened, and are not audited. Enforcement belongs on
the read, not the listing: hiding an item does not stop a caller asking for it by name.mode and conditions. ENFORCE denies, AUDIT records
what it would have done under hookAudit in the audit record and changes nothing at all (it cannot
deny and cannot rewrite the response), OFF never runs it. Conditions narrow a hook by
operations, methods (globs), caller groups and sources. Host-supplied hooks always enforce
for every operation: a host that compiled a control in did not ask for it to be advisory.engine.control.HookBinding, reusing the existing ControlMode.HooksTest.enforceDeniesAndAuditOnlyRecords, ...offIsNeverConsulted,
...conditionsNarrowAHookToOperationsMethodsGroupsAndSources,
ContentHooksTest.auditModeRecordsWhatItWouldHaveDoneAndChangesNothing.AUDIT proves what a hook would have blocked, not that blocking it is safe.type: remote)remote hook POSTs a description of the operation to an HTTP endpoint,
which answers {"allow": true} or {"allow": false, "code": ..., "reason": ...}. Anything else,
including a non-200, a malformed body, a non-boolean allow or a timeout, is a denial. Arguments
and results are withheld unless the operator opts in (includeArguments, includeResult); the
endpoint always gets the caller, operation, typed resources and argument digest. The endpoint URL is
checked against the egress allow list at startup, so a configured control cannot quietly become
an unreviewed data path.config.hooks.RemoteHook over BoundedHttp, wired as a built-in type in
GatewayFactory.RemoteHookTest: answer contract, unreachable and slow endpoints, what leaves the
gateway, phases, wiring through configuration, and the startup egress refusal.type: sql-readonly)POST /sql with select 1 is a read; the same tool with drop table orders is not. A
READ tool needs no write group, no approval and no dry-run receipt, so a tool named
run_sql_readonly classified READ carried no control at all. Aegis 0.1 had a ReadOnlyGuard
SPI for this; 2.0 had dropped it, which was a governance regression found by the design review
(DESIGN-REVIEW-AND-GAPS.md §1).SELECT, WITH, SHOW, EXPLAIN, DESCRIBE, DESC,
VALUES, TABLE) and no writing or session-changing keyword anywhere. Unterminated quotes and
comments are refused rather than guessed at. A call carrying none of the named arguments is denied,
so a misbound guard cannot silently pass everything. Bound to the SQL-bearing HTTP tools and reinforced
inside jdbc_run_query for the Hive and Calcite JDBC configurations.config.hooks.SqlReadOnlyHook, wired as a built-in hook type in GatewayFactory.SqlReadOnlyHookTest: statements that must pass include keywords inside literals,
quoted identifiers, comments and OFFSET (which must not match SET); 29 that must be refused
including multi-statement, SELECT ... INTO OUTFILE, WITH ... INSERT and unterminated quotes.
AdapterConfigsTest.sqlToolsClassifiedReadCannotBeUsedToWrite proves it end to end through all four
configs: the read path still works and six writing statements per tool are denied with
INVALID_INPUT without reaching the backend.select my_function() passes and a
user-defined function can usually write. The control that actually enforces read-only is a read-only
credential on the source; this hook narrows the gap, and an operator who wants certainty classifies
the tool MUTATE.OLGA for olga) is still the requester.APPROVAL_DECISION) before it takes effect; if the journal
cannot record it, the decision is not made (503).engine.approval.ApprovalService, SignedTokens, mcp.admin.AdminApi.GovernanceEngineTest.mutateNeedsApprovalBoundToCallerToolAndExactArgumentsAndIsSingleUse,
...separationOfDutiesHoldsAcrossDelegationAndDelegatedCallersCannotApprove, ...newApprovalRequestsPerCallerAreBounded,
GatewayHostTest (over HTTP, self-approval 403), SeparationOfDutiesTest (seven adversarial
cases: respelled requester, respelled delegated subject, definition change, receipt after a
definition change, cross-gateway replay, approver evidence, unrecordable decision), Knox cold
install V1 to V7, and every ExampleConfigsTest flow.toString() of values, and its receipt check was get-then-remove.GATEWAY: governance preflight only.ARGUMENT: the backend’s native preview, for example Kafka validateOnly.TOOL: a preview tool, for example loading the Iceberg table first.READ
tool in the same source. A converter source resolves the preview tool’s own executor, rather than
falling back to the destructive executor.engine.approval.VrpService, catalog.DryRunSpec, GatewayFactory.SourceBuild.GovernanceEngineTest.destructiveFollowsValidateApprovePromoteAndNeverSendsControlValuesToBackend,
ExampleConfigsTest.iceberg (TOOL), .kafkaConnectAndAdminClient (ARGUMENT),
DryRunPreviewToolTest (converter-shaped source runs the READ preview and never the destructive
operation), RealKafkaTest (a real broker validates without creating),
SeparationOfDutiesTest.aDryRunReceiptCannotPromoteAfterTheToolDefinitionChanged.prev and hash (SHA-256 chain).ALLOW_INTENT is written before execution. If that write fails, the call is not executed
(AUDIT_UNAVAILABLE).engine.audit.HashChainFileAuditSink, AuditChainVerifier.HashChainFileAuditSinkTest, GovernanceEngineTest.auditFailureDeniesBeforeExecution,
Knox cold install (13 records verified across a gateway restart).content and
structuredContent. Output is truncated past maxBytes. Counts are recorded in _meta and audit.engine.control.OutputGuard.GovernanceEngineTest.outputSecretsAreRedactedAtAnyDepth.CATALOG_INTEGRITY).SOURCE_INVALID.engine.catalog.ToolCatalog, CatalogIntegrity.GovernanceEngineTest.rugPullQuarantinesToolUntilOperatorAccepts, ...duplicateToolNamesAbortLoad,
ExistingMcpServerProxyTest.rugPullOnDownstreamServerIsQuarantinedOnRefresh.defaultClass (DESTRUCTIVE). An upstream destructiveHint
can raise the class, and nothing lowers it. unlistedTools: HIDE exposes only listed tools.GatewayFactory.SourceBuild.bind, ToolClass.max.GatewayFactoryTest.yamlConfigBuildsAGovernedGatewayOverRestAndAnExistingMcpServer,
ExistingMcpServerProxyTest.unclassifiedDownstreamToolDefaultsToDestructive..., ExampleConfigsTest.existingMcpServerOverHttpAndStdio.protocolVersion unused. The 2026-07-28 revision removes sessions and
initialize and requires header and body agreement._meta. MCP-Protocol-Version, Mcp-Method and Mcp-Name
are required, and the base64 sentinel is decoded. A mismatch returns 400 / -32020 and an
unsupported version returns 400 / -32022 with supported.server/discover is implemented. List results carry ttlMs and cacheScope: private.Mcp-Method and Mcp-Name are validated whenever they are present.logging/setLevel are not served.mcp.server.McpServerHandler, SessionRegistry, protocol.*.McpServerHandlerTest, Knox cold install K6 (header smuggling refused inside Knox).AUTO era detection, per the 2026-07-28 backward-compatibility procedure.mcp.client.HttpMcpClient, StdioMcpClient, McpProxyToolSource.ExistingMcpServerProxyTest, against a handler-independent test server,
covering modern, legacy with session, legacy stateless, and stdio in both eras).. and .. are refused.{arg/} carries several segments, for APIs whose identifier is itself a
path (HDFS files, ZooKeeper znodes, object-store keys). Each segment is validated and encoded
separately, so depth is allowed but climbing is not.{arg}, in deterministic order.config.http.HttpToolExecutor, HttpToolSpec.GatewayFactoryTest.httpTemplatesAreInjectionSafe,
GatewayFactoryTest.pathTypedPlaceholderAcceptsDepthButNotTraversal, ExampleConfigsTest (Flink,
Spark, Iceberg, Kafka Connect), AdapterConfigsTest (27 deployable adapter configurations and 123 tools),
RealFlinkTest, RealIcebergRestCatalogTest, RealKafkaTest, RealSparkTest.tools.yaml, its own test and its own release surface. Every
new engine meant new code to review, and every adapter was a place a governance mistake could hide.adopters/configurations/adapters/. REST surfaces use
declarative http tools. Hive and Calcite use the JDBC converter. ZooKeeper uses its client-protocol converter for znodes and HTTP for AdminServer commands. Arrow, Beam, Hudi, Kudu, and Ozone are planned typed sources for a later release. The shared governance engine remains the sole policy owner: arguments are
schema-validated; named objects become typed resources; writes need approval; destructive calls need a
dry-run receipt.<engine>://status MCP resources are represented by governed READ tools where the product
has an equivalent supported surface.purge_queue no longer lets the caller influence the JMX MBean name: the MBean is fixed
by the operator and only destinationName comes from the caller.adopters/configurations/adapters/*/*.yaml, aegis-source-jdbc and
aegis-source-zookeeper.AdapterConfigsTest loads all 27 deployable adapter configurations and 123 tools and exercises
their governance flow. DocumentationClaimsTest binds the published inventory to those files.
JdbcToolSourceTest and ZooKeeperToolSourceTest exercise converter behavior against actual Apache
software. ZooKeeperAdminCommandsTest checks command names against ZooKeeper’s own registry.BoundedHttp. Off unless tracing.otlp.endpoint is set; the endpoint is
checked against the egress allow list at startup. The request thread only offers the span to a bounded
queue, a daemon thread batches and posts, and a full queue drops and counts spans, so a broken, slow or
absent collector cannot add latency to a governed call or fail one. Span attributes deliberately carry
no caller identity, arguments or results; correlation to the audit journal is by aegis.request_id.OtlpSpanExporter in the aegis-observability-otlp module, as a DecisionListener; DecisionListener.Event gained a
Span component (span id, parent span id, start time) so an exporter has the identity it needs.OtlpSpanExporterTest: document shape against the trace service contract, denial to an
error span with the stable deny code, a text assertion that no caller or argument field appears in the
document, root spans omitting parentSpanId, spans reaching a local collector test endpoint with drain on
close, a 500 and an absent collector counted rather than thrown, and a full queue dropping instead of
blocking.type: <name> selects a ToolSourceFactory. A provider whose own dependencies are
missing is skipped with a warning and does not break other sources.config.spi.*, examples.kafka.KafkaAdminToolSourceFactory.ExampleConfigsTest.kafkaConnectAndAdminClient (a real Kafka 3.9.1 KRaft broker in its own JVM, default build), RealKafkaTest and KafkaFrontDoorsTest (real broker and Connect worker, -Preal-engines).config.ConfigNode, ConfigLoader, GatewayFactory.GatewayFactoryTest.none, no RS/HS confusion), exact issuer, required audience,
bounded JWKS with fail-closed expiry and kid rotation, and RFC 8693 act as the actor chain.host.*.GatewayHostTest: HS256 over real HTTP, RS256 JWKS rotation and delegation, and stdio.aegis-mcp/v1/**?**.provided scope.knox.*.KnoxExtensionTest, and the stock Knox 3.0.0 cold-install evidence linked from VALIDATION.md.tools/call, resources/read and prompts/get: the client’s declared
elicitation/sampling/roots capabilities are forwarded; an input_required result passes to a
2026 client redacted (content-screened for resources and prompts); the retry is governed again as
a new request, with inputResponses screened and URL-checked like arguments and requestState
bounded and forwarded unchanged. A 2025 client receives an explanatory error, and MRTR fields in a
2025 request are rejected.RoundTrip, McpServerHandler.callTool/roundTrip/legacySafe, McpProxyToolSource,
McpContentSource, ContentGovernor.inputRequired.McpRoundTripTest.toolInputRequiredIsRelayedRedactedAndTheRetryIsGovernedAndForwarded (a backend tool that returns an input_required result: passed through to a
2026 client with redaction applied, explanatory error for a 2025 client, and the retry governed
as a new call).resources/read, prompts/get and
completion/complete is a READ action through exposure, input, scope, policy (tool = the MCP
method, resource mcp:resource:<uri> / mcp:prompt:<name>), egress, rate, breaker, argument
screening, intent audit, execution, then rebuilt results (spec fields only), redaction, binary
refusal unless allowed, size bound and content screening. A URI routes to exactly one source;
returned content URIs must stay inside that source’s patterns. Lists are filtered, redacted,
screened and rate limited. Capabilities advertise only what is served; subscriptions and
logging/setLevel stay unsupported and unadvertised. Denials are JSON-RPC -32010 with the stable code.ContentGovernor, ContentSettings, ContentSource SPI, McpContentSource,
McpServerHandler.contentRequest, GatewayFactory.contentSettings.ContentGovernanceTest, covering both eras and stdio against the handler-independent test server,
GatewayFactoryTest.resourcesAndPromptsAreOptInStrictAndServedThroughTheHandler.prompt:<name>);
with a signed server catalog, the pin must be in the record of the source that advertised the prompt;
a changed or poisoned definition is quarantined, hidden and denied with CATALOG_INTEGRITY until
an approver accepts the exact reviewed digest using POST /prompts/{name}/accept with one
Aegis-Definition-Digest: sha256:... header. Prompt message text is templated per call, so it is
screened rather than pinned.ContentGovernor.buildPrompts/classify/acceptPrompt, CatalogIntegrity, AdminApi.ContentGovernanceTest.promptRugPullIsQuarantinedUntilAccepted, promptsArePrefixedValidatedAndScreened.traceparent from _meta (or the HTTP header as fallback) is strictly parsed per
W3C (invalid values start a new root), continued with the gateway’s own span id, written to audit
(traceId, spanId, parentSpanId), returned in the decision _meta, and forwarded to HTTP
backends and downstream MCP servers (header and _meta). No exporter: correlation only.TraceContext, ExecutionContext.traceparent, HttpToolExecutor, McpProxyToolSource,
McpContentSource, McpServerHandler.post.ObservabilityTest (parsing rules, audit, forwarding), TracePropagationTest (downstream
MCP server sees it, both carriers), GatewayHostTest.metricsAreAuthenticatedAndTraceReachesTheRestBackend.DecisionListener SPI (read-only; failures ignored) and DecisionMetrics: counters
by kind, method, source and outcome, backend calls, latency histogram, Prometheus text 0.0.4,
zero dependencies. Label values are bounded by configuration (unknown tools fold into _unknown);
no caller, resource or argument is ever a label. The gateway’s own /metrics is authenticated (optional
group restriction); Knox serves aegis-mcp/v1/metrics behind the topology’s providers.spi/DecisionListener, observe/DecisionMetrics, AegisServer.metrics, AegisMcpResource.metrics.ObservabilityTest, TracePropagationTest, GatewayHostTest.type: spark-connect plugin using the official Spark Connect JVM client; Spark runs
in its own process. Five READ-by-construction tools, spark_sql and spark_drop_table as
DESTRUCTIVE with TOOL previews (EXPLAIN, describe). Identifiers validated and back-quoted; rows
capped; timeouts interrupt the Spark operation by tag; Spark analysis errors are caller errors,
transport failures trip the breaker; a token is only sent over TLS; the endpoint passes the
egress guard as http(s)://host:port.examples/aegis-spark-connect (SparkConnectToolSource, SparkConnectSettings, factory);
examples/aegis-gateway-spark (runnable jar).SparkConnectSourceTest, RealSparkConnectServerTest against a real Spark
4.0.1 Spark Connect server in a separate JVM), the tutorial run.ext/ is easy to get partly wrong.knox-bundle classifier that merges exactly the five Aegis modules Knox
needs (engine, mcp, observability-otlp, config, extension) and their ServiceLoader files, and nothing of Knox, Jersey, Jackson or servlet.aegis-knox3-extension/pom.xml (shade with an explicit include list).KnoxPackagingBoundaryTest) and the Knox cold-install evidence linked from VALIDATION.md.credentials.type: token-exchange sends the caller’s verified inbound JWT to the
identity provider with the gateway’s client credentials and presents the returned backend-audience
token. The inbound token is held in a request-scoped SubjectToken, outside CallerIdentity, so it
never reaches audit, hooks or policy input, and it is never sent to a backend. No fallback, and a
per-token cache. An issued token that parses as a JWT must carry a non-blank string sub equal to
the caller’s subject; opaque tokens are passed on as issued.config.credentials.TokenExchangeCredentials, SourceCredentialProvider,
engine.spi.SubjectToken, bound by AegisServer for JWT callers.TokenExchangeCredentialsTest; Keycloak 26.8.0 run (evidence).type: a2a (aegis-source-a2a) offers one A2A 1.0 agent as one tool over JSON-RPC
SendMessage. The card’s endpoint must be on the card’s origin or pinned, and it is part of the tool
description, so a moved endpoint quarantines the tool.A2aToolSourceTest; A2aAgentFrontDoorsTest against an a2a-sdk 1.2.1 agent, both front doors.--openapi-draft turns an OpenAPI 3.x document into an http source with every tool
DESTRUCTIVE and a deny-all policy, listing what it could not express as warnings.OpenApiDraftTest, OpenApiDraftCommandTest, OpenApiDraftIcebergTest (Iceberg 1.10.1 document and server).adopters/hooks/ has a PII guard, a secrets guard and a change window in Python’s
standard library, speaking the type: remote contract.test_hooks.py; e2e_gateway.py against the running gateway jar (also in CI).charts/aegis/ci/start_rendered.py; the image is built
and started in CI (chart README)./mcp, not which tool a token may call.tools.<name>.actionScopes lists OAuth scopes the caller’s verified JWT must carry.
Matching is exact; every listed scope is required. The check runs at step 2, before resource scopes,
policy, approval, credentials or the backend, and a miss is SCOPE_DENIED. The scopes are part of
the approval and dry-run binding only when non-empty, so unscoped tools keep their digests. On the
own host a JWT caller refused for missing action scopes gets HTTP 403 with
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer error="insufficient_scope", scope="<route scopes> <tool scopes>" (the MCP
step-up flow); the body is still the JSON-RPC result with SCOPE_DENIED.JwtVerifier.verifyWithScopes, CallerIdentity.scopes, GovernedTool.actionScopes,
Action.requiredActionScopes, GovernanceEngine (step 2), engine.spi.ScopeChallenge,
AegisServer.stepUp.GovernanceEngineTest.missingActionScopeDeniesBeforeCredentialsOrBackendAndFullGrantProceeds,
GatewayFactoryTest.actionScopesAreTrustedToolRequirementsAndDenyBeforeBackendAccess, JwtVerifierTest,
ProtectedResourceMetadataTest.aToolCallWithoutTheToolsActionScopesGetsAStepUpChallengeNamingThem.serverCatalog is an offline Ed25519-signed register of which sources[] may start,
each ACTIVE one bound to its configuration digest and its exact tool pins. It forces
REQUIRE_PINS and refuses run-time acceptance. A break-glass order signed with a separate key can
quarantine or revoke listed servers for at most 24 hours; it cannot activate anything, and an
expired order is a startup error. The host can pin the review key outside the configuration
(--require-server-catalog <review.pub>, AEGIS_REQUIRE_SERVER_CATALOG_KEY or
-Daegis.requireServerCatalogKey, an absolute path): the gateway then refuses a configuration without
serverCatalog or with a different publicKeyFile. Catalogs, manifests and orders can carry a
signed serial (--serial <n> on the create commands); the highest accepted serial per kind is kept
in the state store and an older or unnumbered file is then refused.engine.catalog.SignedServerCatalog, BreakGlassContainment, SignedSerial,
GatewayFactory, gateway.ServerCatalogCommands (--server-catalog-create/-verify,
--break-glass-create/-verify).SignedServerCatalogTest, SignedSerialTest, ServerCatalogConfigTest (including
aHostPinnedReviewKeyCannotBeDroppedOrSwappedByEditingTheConfiguration and
anOlderSignedCatalogOrOrderIsRefusedOnceANewerOneWasAccepted), ServerCatalogFlowTest; the
real-engine FlinkFrontDoorsTest, IcebergFrontDoorsTest, SparkFrontDoorsTest and
KafkaFrontDoorsTest run with a signed catalog through both doors (local, not retained); four runnable servers in
examples/break-glass-mcp-servers.derby-local or postgres state, for one process with
in-memory state. The host trust anchor applies when the host sets it.--policy-test <aegis.yaml> <cases.json> loads a configuration that contains only
declarative type: http sources, moves audit and state to a temporary directory, removes tracing
and source credentials, then evaluates each case (caller, tool, arguments) through the same exposure,
schema, resource, scope and built-in rule-policy steps as a live call. It refuses a remote OPA PDP,
MCP and plugin sources before they could contact a backend. It prints each case with
the deny code, APPROVAL_REQUIRED or ALLOWED, and exits 0 when every case matches its expect,
1 when one does not, 2 on a usage error. Nothing is executed, journaled or approved.gateway.PolicyTestCommand, GovernanceEngine.explain (shares preflight with call).PolicyTestCommandTest, GovernanceEngineTest.explainGivesTheDecisionACallMeetsWithoutJournalingStateOrBackend.approvalToken in required[].
2.0 carries control values in _meta and advertises the 0.1 argument names as optional. If the
token were required, a strict client could not make the first call that opens the approval
request.CATALOG_INTEGRITY and AUDIT_UNAVAILABLE (see DENY-CODES.md).