Aegis Gateway 2.0

ADR-001: an A2A agent joins Aegis as a tool source; no A2A front door

Context

The question was whether Aegis should also govern the Agent2Agent protocol (A2A), the Linux Foundation project for agents that discover and delegate work to other agents (specification). Aegis 2.0 governs MCP: an agent calling tools, reading resources and fetching prompts on systems such as Spark, Flink and Kafka.

What the A2A specification defines, in summary (paraphrased from the specification):

Decision

Two parts, and the distinction matters more than the original version of this ADR admitted.

  1. Aegis 2.0 does not speak A2A on its front door. There is no A2A endpoint, no Agent Card served, no task lifecycle, no push-notification webhook. The reasons are below.
  2. Calling another agent is a tool call, and that is already the governed shape. A remote A2A agent can be exposed to the model as an ordinary MCP tool through a ToolSource, in which case every existing control applies to the delegation: classification, resource scoping, policy, egress, rate limits, approval, audit, output redaction and screening. That is the accepted direction for A2A support, and it needs no new engine.

The original ADR only stated part 1, which left the impression that A2A traffic simply cannot be governed by Aegis. That was wrong in an important way: the interesting risk is not “Aegis does not serve A2A”, it is “a model delegates work to another agent and nobody recorded or bounded it”. Part 2 is where that risk is actually addressed: delegated work becomes an ordinary governed tool action with an explicit caller, target, bounded resource surface and audit record.

Original design sketch, superseded by the implementation below

The following records the decision as it stood before implementation. It is not a description of the current source:

Update 2026-10-03: part 2 is implemented, with four changes from the sketch above

The a2a source now exists (aegis-source-a2a, profile). Part 1 is unchanged: there is still no A2A front door. Three points differ from the sketch, each for a reason found while building it:

The credential sent to the agent is the source’s own, or a per-caller token when the source uses credentials.type: token-exchange. Evidence: A2aToolSourceTest, and A2aAgentFrontDoorsTest against an agent built on the official a2a-sdk 1.2.1, through both front doors.

Reasons for keeping the front door MCP-only

  1. A different unit of governance. Aegis decides on a tool call: a named operation, typed arguments, typed resources, a READ / MUTATE / DESTRUCTIVE class, an exact argument digest that an approval is bound to. An A2A message is natural-language or structured content addressed to another agent, whose effect on real systems is decided by that agent, not visible to the gateway. Several controls that make Aegis useful (resource extraction, dry run, a receipt for the exact action) have little to bind to. Exposing the agent as a tool does not remove that limit; it makes it explicit, which is why an operator must classify the agent by its strongest possible effect. An unclassified A2A tool is DESTRUCTIVE; the reference profile explicitly classifies its inventory agent MUTATE, and both classes require approval.
  2. A different state model. A2A tasks are long-lived, stateful objects with their own lifecycle. Aegis 2.0 is designed so that no governance state depends on protocol state (that is why it works for both the stateful 2025 MCP and the stateless 2026-07-28 MCP). Governing A2A properly means tracking task ownership and every status and artifact update, which is a different engine.
  3. A different direction of traffic. Push notifications are server-initiated HTTP calls to a client-chosen URL. Aegis deliberately refuses server-to-client requests on MCP streams; accepting webhooks would reverse a core safety property and needs its own egress and SSRF design.
  4. Scope creep would weaken what exists. A half-built A2A proxy would be a second, less tested policy surface next to a well-tested one. The review of 2.0 is easier, and the result safer, if the protocol surface stays exactly MCP.

What still works today

Future work on the A2A decision

Consequences