Filesystem path traversal
CVE-2025-53109 and CVE-2025-53110 in the Filesystem MCP server, and the symlink variant CVE-2025-67366. A read tool is handed ../../secret.txt or a symlink and returns a file outside the allowed root.
PROOF, NOT CLAIM
Three classes of publicly disclosed MCP server vulnerability are reproduced locally and attacked twice. Straight at the server, the exploit works. Through the Aegis gateway with the hardened profile, each call is denied at a named step or its output is contained, and every decision is written to the audit journal. The evidence below is from a real run of the 2.0 build, not an illustration.
THE TARGETS
CVE-2025-53109 and CVE-2025-53110 in the Filesystem MCP server, and the symlink variant CVE-2025-67366. A read tool is handed ../../secret.txt or a symlink and returns a file outside the allowed root.
CVE-2025-69256 in the Serverless Framework experimental MCP server. Unsanitised input reaches a shell, so a crafted argument runs arbitrary commands.
CVE-2025-68143 and CVE-2025-68145 in the Git MCP server. Path and argument handling let a caller read or delete files and, under conditions, execute code.
All three are server-side: the malicious intent is in the MCP call. Aegis decides on that call before it reaches the server, so it can refuse the traversal, the shell and the unsafe statement without changing the server.
CVE identifiers and version facts come from the SentinelOne vulnerability database and the CVE-2025-69256 write-up. Content was rephrased for licensing compliance.
BEFORE AND AFTER
Each row is a verbatim outcome from the 2026-11-07 run. "Direct" is the raw server. "Aegis" is the identical call through the gateway as a read-only analyst, unless the row says operator.
| Leg | Call | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Direct | read_file path=secret.txt | Returns payroll-secret. Exploit succeeds. |
| Aegis | read_file path=reports/ok.txt | Allowed: quarterly-report (inside scope). |
| Aegis | read_file path=secret.txt | Denied SCOPE_DENIED: resource out of scope. |
| Aegis | read_file path=reports/../../secret.txt | Denied SCOPE_DENIED: resource value contains '..'. |
| Leg | Call | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Direct | run_shell "echo pwned & echo injected" | Shell chain runs. Exploit succeeds. |
| Direct | admin_exec whoami | admin executed whoami. |
| Aegis | run_shell ... as analyst | Denied READONLY_CALLER: not allowed to call DESTRUCTIVE tools. |
| Aegis | run_shell ... as operator | Denied APPROVAL_REQUIRED: needs an independent per-call approval. |
| Aegis | admin_exec ... | Denied NOT_EXPOSED: unknown tool (not in the catalog). |
| Leg | Call | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Direct | query_sql "SELECT 1; DROP TABLE users" | Statement executed. Exploit succeeds. |
| Aegis | query_sql "SELECT 1; DROP TABLE users" | Denied INVALID_INPUT: more than one statement supplied. |
| Aegis | query_sql "SELECT pg_sleep(30)" | Denied: calls a function with side effects. |
| Aegis | query_sql "... write_to_s3(...) ..." | Denied: function not on the allow list. |
| Aegis | query_sql "SELECT count(*) ... GROUP BY region" | Allowed: a genuine read-only query. |
SAME RUN
169.254.169.254 is made directly; through Aegis it is denied EGRESS_DENIED, host not on the allow list.[REDACTED].CATALOG_INTEGRITY.An unauthenticated call returns 401. An undeclared argument is denied INVALID_INPUT. Each denial carries a machine-readable decision in the response _meta and a line in the hash-chained audit journal.
HONEST SCOPE
REPRODUCE
The harness, the gateway profile and the driver are in the repository. The run starts the vulnerable server and the gateway on loopback, sends every call on both legs, and writes a results table. Nothing touches a real database, cloud API or system file.
powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File threat-model\e2e\run-e2e.ps1
# writes threat-model/e2e/RESULTS.md and results.json
REFERENCE MAP